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THE GOVERNMENT AS VENTURE
CAPITALIST: THE LONG-RUN IMPACT
OF THE SBIR PROGR4M
ABSTRACT
Public programs to provide early-stage financing to firms, particularly high-technology
companies, have become commonplace in the United States and abroad. The long-run effectiveness
of these programs, however, has attracted little empirical scrutiny. This paper examines the impact
of the largest U.S. public venture capital initiative, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program, which has provided over $6 billion to small high-technology firms between 1983 and 1995.
Using a unique database of awardees compiled by the U.S. General Accounting Office, I show that
SBIR awardees grew significantly faster than a matched set of firms over a ten-year period. The
positive effects of SBIR awards were confined to firms based in zip codes with substantial venture
capital activity. The findings are consistent with both the corporate finance literature on capital
constraints and the growth literature on the importance of localization effects.
Josh Lemer







The federal government has played an active role in financing new firms, particularly in
high-technology industries, since the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik satellite. In recent years,
European and Asian nations and many U.S. states have adopted similar initiatives. While these
programs’ precise structures have differed, the efforts have been predicated on two shared
assumptions: (~ that the private sector provides insufficient capital to new firms, and (i) that the
government can identify firms where investments will ultimately yield high social and/or private
returns.’ These claims have, however, received little scrutiny by economists.2
lIt is striking to note the similarities between, for instance, the statement of Senator John
Sparkman [1958] upon the passage of the Small Business Investment Act and the recent testimony
of Dr. Mary Good, Under Secretary for Technology at the U.S. Department of Commerce [1995].
The rationales for such programs are discussed in depth in U.S. Congressional Budget Office
[1985].
2While both government agencies and academic economists have sought repeatedly to assess the
efficacy of federal programs to aid technology-intensive industries, they have tended to focus on
different questions. Most federal evaluations of these programs have consisted of case studies and
surveys of the commercial activity directjy attributable to the awards. Examples of such
evaluations of the SBIR program include Myers, Stem, and Rorke [1983], Price, Waterhouse
[1985], and U.S. General Accounting Office [1987a, 1989, 1992]. Surveys of direct commercial
impacts are subject to several biases. For instance, in the case of the SBIR program, small business
advocates conducted a protracted lobbying campaign to expand the program. Executives active in
this effort may have overstatd the benefits from the awards. At the same time, some firms had
reasons to downplay the commercial benefits of the program. During the early 1990s, a number of
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that developed research originally funded by the
National Institutes of Health were intensely scrutinized. Firms that received spectacular
commercial benefits from the SBIR program may have been reluctant to acknowledge them, lest
they attract unwelcome attention from reporters and politicians. Finally, because many firms
pursued SBIR projects closely related to their core technologies, determining the direct impact of
an SBIR award may have been difficult. Studies of federal technology programs by academic
economists, beginning with Levy and Terleckyj [1983], have tended to focus on the short-run
effects of these effofis. In particular, they ask whether federal finds substitute for or stimulate
private R&D spending. For instance, Irwin and Klenow [1994] show that semiconductor
manufacturers substantially reduced their own R&D spending while participating in the Sematech
1The neglect of these questions is unfortunate While the sums of money involved are
modest relative to public expenditures on defense procurement or retiree benefit% these programs-
surnmarized in Table l—are very substantial when compared to contemporaneous private
investments in new firms. For instance, the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program
led to the provision of more than $3 billion to young firms between 1958 and 1969, more than three
times the total private venture capital investment during these years (Noone and Rubel [1970]). In
1995, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program provided almost $900 million to
young technology-intensive firms. This was about equal to the annual rate of early-stage
investments by venture capitalists in recent years (Venture Economics [1996], U.S. Small Business
Administration [1996]). Some of America’s most dynamic technology companies received support
through the SBIC and SBIR programs while still private entities, including Apple Computer,
Chiron, Compaq, Federal Express, and Intel. Public venture capital programs have also had a
significant impact overseas: for instance, these programs have accounted for more than one-half of
the recent investments in new German technology -intensivefirms (Wupperfeld [1992]).
The recent economic literature suggests reasons to be both optimistic and skeptical about
the efficacy of public venture programs. On the positive side, a growing body of writing suggests
that new firms, especially technology-intensive ones, may be receiving insufficient capital. The
literature on capital constraints (reviewed in Hubbard [1996]) documents that an inability to obtain
external financing limits many forms of business investment. Particularly relevant are works by
consortium. Wallsten [1996] shows that the subset of SBIR awardees that were publicly traded
reduced their own spending on R&D in the years immediately following the award.
2Hall [1992], Hao and Jaffe [1993], and Himrnelberg and Petersen [1994]. These show that capital
constraints appear to limit research-and-development expenditures, especially in smaller firms. It
might be thought that these effects would have been particulady strong during the 1970s and early
1980s, when the venture capital pool was relatively modest in size. As the first panel of Table 2
reports, the pool of venture capital fids has grown dramatically in recent years. This has been
largely due to the relaxation of the regulations and informal curbs that precluded many pension
finds from investing in this asset class (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse [1995]). The capital constraints
literature suggests that public awards to high-technology firms should be associated with significant
growth, as firms pursue value-creating projects that they would otherwise be unable to finance?
On the opposing side, the corporate finance literature highlights the importance of private
mechanisms to finance young, high-growth firms. The dominant form of financing is venture
capita~ which accounts for about two-thirds of the external equity financing raised from pnvate-
sector sources by privately held technology-intensive businesses (Freear and Wetzel [1990]).
Venture investors frequently disburse finds in stages. Managers of these venture-backed firms are
forced to repeatedly return to their financiers for additional capital, in order to ensure that the
money is not squandered on unprofitable projects. In addition, venture capitalists intensively
monitor managers. These investors demand prefemed stock with numerous restrictive covenants
and representation on the board of directors. (Various aspects of the oversight role played by
private equity investors are documented in Gompers [1995], Lemer [1995], and Sahlman [1990];
3Arelated body of literature documents that investments in R&D yield high private and social
rates of return (e.g., Griliches [1986], Mansfield, et al, [1977]). These findings similarly suggest
that a higher level of R&D spending would be desirable.
3the theoretical literature is reviewed in Barry [1994].) Government officials are unlikely to have the
expertise or resources to effectively monitor entrepreneurs. Consequently, even if an award of
public finds to an entrepreneurial firm leads to a short-run expansion in activities, the increase is
unlikely to be sustainable.
The academic literature also differs in its predictions of where public grants will have the
greatest impact. Venture capital financing is concentrated in particular regions and sectors. The
second and third panels of Table 2 document this pattern, showing the distribution of early-stage
venture financing by state and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code between 1983 and
1985 (the period in which the SBIR awards under study in this paper were made). The
concentration of awards in California and Massachusetts, as well as in computer hardware and
sotiare sectors, is apparent.
This concentration can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, several models argue
that institutional investors frequently engage in “herding”: making investments that are too similar
to one another. These models suggest that a variety of factor=for instance, when performance is
assessed on a relative, not an absolute, basis-can lead to investors obtaining poor performance by
making too similar investments. (Much of the theoretical literature is reviewed in Devenow and
Welch [1996]; Sahlman and Stevenson [1986] present a case study suggesting such behavior by
venture capitalists) These models suggest that public investments in sectors and regions less
4heavily supported by venture capitalists might lead to superior returns, because value-creating
investments in less popular areas may have been ignored
On the other hand, recent models of economic growtbbuilding on earlier works by
economic geographers-have emphasized powerful reasons why successful high-technology firms
may be very concentrated. The literature highlights several factors that lead similar firms to cluster
in particular regions including knowledge spillovers, specialized labor markets, and the presence of
critical intermediate good producers (The theoretical rationales for such effects are summarized in
Krugman [1991 ].) Case studies of the development of high-technology regions (e.g., Saxenian
[1994]) have emphasized the importance of intermediaries such as venture capitalists, lawyers, and
accountants in facilitating such clustering If these effects are important, and the supply of venture
capital was restricted as discussed above, then we might expect public awards to have particular
impact if they were dispersed in the same regions as independent venture capitalists invested.
This analysis assesses the long-run success of firms participating in the largest U.S. public
venture capital initiative the SBIR program. I examind the employment and sales growth of 1135
firms. Approximately half of the sample received one or more awards of approximately one-half
million dollars in the first three cycles of the SBIR progra~ the other half were matching firms
constructed to resemble the SBIR awardees as closely as possible. In order to assess the program, I
relied heavily on a unique longitudinal data-set of awardees compiled by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO).
5One decade later, the SBIR awardees have enjoyed substantially greater employment and
sales growth than the matching firms. This superior performance, however, was not universal. The
differentials in both employment and sales growth were confined to firms in zip codes that were
simultaneously the site of substantial venture capital activity. The SBIR awards appear to have had
much less impact on the performance of firms in other regions. The awards contributed both to the
growth of firms that were or were not backed by venture capital, and that were or were not in
industries heavily financed by venture capital. Some evidence suggests that the positive impact
was strongest for firms in areas with many venture investments but in industries not frequently
financed by venture capitalists.
While the superior long-run performance of the SBIR awardees is consistent with the
presence of capital constraints, it is clearly not the only interpretation. The selection process might
lead to the identification of firms with superior long-run prospects The provision of funds itself
might make no difference. Alternatively, the selection of a firm for an SBIR award might serve as
a favorable signal to potential customers and investors. In other words, the results are consistent
with the second claim of the first paragraph of the introduction being true, but the first claim not
being true. To address this concern, I employed two sets of matching firms: one set with no
participation in the SBIR program; the other which received at least one much smaller, but highly
competitive, preliminary SBIR awmd (termed Phase I awards). If the SBIR awards simply
identified superior firms, and the capital provided did not make a difference, I anticipated that the
6long-run success of the Phase I awardees would be consistently greater than that of the non-
awardees. The fact that the growth of these two sets of matching firms did not materially differ
from each other—both lagged the performance of recipients of the fill SBIR awardesuggested
that the capital provided was important The results are also robust to controls for the hypothesis
that SBIR awardees grew because they established relationships with federal officials or politicians,
which led to procurement contracts.
These findings are relevant for several reasons. First, they are consistent with both the
corporate finance literature on capital constraints and the growth literature on the importance of
localization effects. Second, they provide guidance as to what types of public venture programs
are likely to be effective. In particular, they underscore doubts about recent federal efforts to
encourage the formation of venture finds investing in economically distressed areas here and
abroad. Finally, the findings are relevant to the intensi~ing policy debate surrounding the SBIR
program itself. While the results cannot be unambiguously interpreted, they call into question
the arguments of university and medical center administrators (summarized in Mervis [1996])
that the program has not produced any economic benefits.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I review the structure of SBIR awards,
and why they may address the financing needs of smaller firms. The third section describes the
data set. Section 4 presents the analysis, and the final section concludes the paper.
72. The SBIR Program and the Financing of Entrepreneurial Firms
The Small Business Innovation Development Act, enacted by Congress in July 1982,
established the SBIR program. The progra~modeled after a pioneering program initiated by the
National Science Foundation in 1977—mandated that all federal agencies spending more than $100
million annually on external research set aside a fixed percentage of these funds for awards to small
businesses The act required that 1.25% of all external research be allocated for this progrm (The
set-aside was phased in over five years.) When the program was reauthorized in 1992, Congress
increased the size of the set-aside. It will reach its new steady-state level of 2.5°/0in 1997, At this
point, total annual funding is projected to be about $1.1 billion.
While the eleven federal agencies participating in the program are responsible for selecting
awardees, they must conform to the guidelines stipulated by the act and the U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA). Awardees must be independently owned, for-profit firms with less than 500
employees, at least 510/0 owned by U.S. citizens or permanent residents. The structure of the
awards is also constrained to be similar across agencies. Promising proposals are awarded Phase I
awards (originally no more than $50,000, today $100,000 or smaller), which are intended to allow
firms to conduct research to determine the feasibility of their ideas. Approximately one-half of the
Phase I awardees are then selected for the more substantial Phase II grants. Phase II awards of at
most $750,000 (originally, one-half million dollars) are designed to support two years of
development work. The funds are transferred to the small firm as a contract or grant. In return for
the finding, the company must provide the agency with a report on the technology under
8development. Thegovement receives noequity inthefim anddoes nothave any ownership
claim on the intellectual property that the firm develops with these funds. Table 3 displays the
annual expenditure= on the SBIR program, the percentage set-aside, and the number of Phase II
awards.
One of the key rationales for the establishment of the SBIR program was that imperfections
existed in the market for the financing of young technology-based firms. These firms are
characterized by considerable uncertain y and information asymmetries that permit opportunistic
behavior by entrepreneurs. As discussed above, the bulk of the equity invested in these firms
comes from venture capitalists, who have developed a variety of mechanisms to limit such
behaviors.
But venture capital has important limitations. Venture funds only back a tiny fraction of the
technology-oriented businesses begun each year: of those firms that submit business plans to
venture organizations, historically only 1YOhave been tided (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse [1995]).
While this may partially reflect the mixed quality of these proposals, it may also reflect regulatory
constraints on pension funds that have until recently limited the size of the venture capital pool.
Private pension funds were essentially prohibited from venture investments by the U.S. Department
of Labor until 1978. Even afier this policy shifi, private pensions did not invest in venture funds in
significant numbers until the mid- 1980s. A variety of regulatory and political factors restrained
substantial venture investments by public pension funds until the 1990s.
9Furthermore, the structure of venture investments is inappropriate for many young firms.
Venture finds tend to make quite substantial investments, even in young firms: the mean venture
investment in a start-up or early-stage business between 1961 and 1992 was $1.8 million (in 1992
dollars) (Gompers [1995]). The substantial size of these investments is largely a consequence of
the demands of institutional investors. The typical venture organization raises a fund (structured as
a limited partnership) every few years. Because investments in partnerships are often time-
consurning to negotiate and monitor, institutions prefer making relatively large investments in
venture funds (typically $10 million or more). Furthermore, governance and regulatory
considerations lead investors to limit the share of the find that any one limited partner holds. (The
structure of venture partnerships is discussed at length in Gompers and Lemer [1996a].) These
pressures lead venture organizations to raise substantial finds. Because each firm in his portfolio
must be closely scrutinized, the typical venture capitalist is typically responsible for no more than a
dozen investments. Venture organizations are consequently unwilling to invest in very young firms
that only require small capital infisions.4
4There are two primary reasons why venture funds do not simply hire more partners if they raise
additional capital. First, the supply of venture capitalists is quite inelastic. The effective oversight
of young companies requires highly specialized skills that can only be developed with years of
experience. A second important factor is the economics of venture partnerships. The typical
venture fund receives a substantial share of its compensation from the amual fee, which is typically
between 2% and 3% of the capital under management. This motivates venture organizations to
increase the capital that each partner manages. Recently several industry leaders have explored
mechanisms to facilitate investments by institutions in very small venture funds. These
partnerships, they hoped, could readily make small investments in start-up firms. These efforts
have encountered considerable difficulties (see Vincenti [1996]).
10The amount that a firm can raise from the leading alternative source of private equity,
individual investors,5 is usually much less than the minimum financing round that a venture find
will consider providing. Freear and Wetzel [1990] report that median financing round raised by
private high-technology firms from individual investors was about $200,000. 82% of the rounds
from individuals were under $500,000. Thus, a substantial gap exists between the resources that
firms can raise from individual investors and from venture capitalists, which SBIR awards may
partially fill.
3. The Data Set
Identi@ing the appropriate metric to assess the long-term effects of the SBIR program is
problematic. Ideally, I would measure both the social and private impacts of the program. While
case studies of a small number of participants in the SBIR program (along the lines, for instance, of
Mansfield, et al. [1977]) might shed some light on the social benefits, such an effort would be
impossible for a larger sample.b
5Freear and Wetzel [1990] report that venture capitalists and individual investors were the source
of81 YO of the external equity financing raised from non-govemrnental sources by a sample of 284
privately held high-technology companies.
‘These analyses were complemented with eleven interviews of Massachusetts firms that had
received at least one Phase II award from the Department of Defense. I thank Department’s
Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization for their help in identifying these firms
and arranging the interviews.
11Even determining an appropriate measure of private benefits was difficult. Ideally, I would
measure the impact of participating in the program on the firms’ valuations. Only 2°/0of the SBIR
awardees in the first three program cycles, however, were publicly held at the time of their initial
Phase I awards. Determining whether participation in the program was associated with an increase
in firm value was consequently difficult. I focused instead on two alternatives: the impact of
participation in the SBIR program on sales and employment. While neither was a perfect measure
of firm value, Paul Gompers and I have shown [1996b] that the valuations assigned to private firms
by venture capitalists are highly correlated with these two scale measures.
As a consequence of their status as private firms, almost all SBIR awardees did not need to
disclose employment or sales information in filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Consequently, I relied on a unique database prepared by the GAO. The GAO
was mandated in the legislation establishing the SBIR program to periodically evaluate the
initiative. In late 1985, the agency generated a sample of 933 firms that received SBIR awards in
the first three program cycles from the twelve federal agencies participating in the program at the
time. This sample included all firms that had received Phase II awards to that date, as well as a
sampling of the firms that had only received the preliminary Phase I awards.’
‘At the time that the survey population was selected, not all firms that received Phase I awards in
fiscal year 1985 had been selected for Phase II awards. Consequently, some firms that received
Phase II awards in the first three program cycles were not included in the survey.
12These firms were surveyed by the GAO in early 1986. The survey collected basic
demographic data (e.g., the firm’s founding date, employment, revenue, and intellectual property
holdings), the avenues through which the firm had been financed prior to and afier the award, and
the organizational changes that occurred afier the award (such as a merger or an initial public
offering). The survey had an 81‘A response rate, which reflected the extensive efforts by GAO,
SBA, and agency officials to track down non-responding entrepreneurs and to encourage them to
complete the survey. The GAO completed a follow-up survey in mid-1988. 86°/0 of the original
respondents answered this survey, as well as 46°/0 of the non-respondents to the first survey. In
total, 835 firms responded to at least one survey. Of these, 541 received Phase II awards in the first
three program cycles, while 294 only received Phase I awards.
In addition to the
sample of 300 firms that
294 firms that only received Phase I awards, I constructed a matching
received no SBIR funds in the first three program cycles. I sought to
select firms that closely resembled the 541 Phase II awardees. I matched firms using Corporate
Technology Information Services’ Corporate Technology Directory [1996], the most
comprehensive directory of U.S. high-technology firms. This directory employs a highly detailed
industry classification scheme, which allows quite precise matches.g I recorded the primary
industry classification of each Phase II awardee in the 1986 edition of the Corporate Teckology
Directory, or the first subsequent volume in which the firm was listed. (In all, 74% of the Phase II
awardees were listed.)
‘For instance, while the SIC classification scheme places all sofiware firms in class 7372, this
directory distinguishes between firms that manufacture educational software used to teach typing
and for music instruction.
13I then pulled a random selection of 300 of these awardees. For each selected firm, I
identified in the 1986 Corporate Technolog Directory the firm in the same classification with the
closest employment level. 9 I excluded as possible matches firms that were units or subsidiaries of
other concerns. I also eliminated firms that had received any Phase I or Phase II awards in the first
three program cycles. (These were determined through U.S. Small Business Administration
[1986].) If there were no matches within the class, I chose a firm in a related industry: e.g., if there
were no appropriate match for a firm classified as a plastic composite laminate manufacturer, I
matched the firm to another composite laminate manufacturer. From the listing for each matching
firm in the Directory, I collected information on sales, employment, location, and founding date. I
determined whether the matching firms had received venture financing using Security Data
Company’s Venture Intelligence Database. This database provides comprehensive information on
venture capital financing, and is described in detail inLemer[1995].
The samples are summarized in Table 4 and 5. Table 4 describes the construction of the
sampl=; Table 5 compares the Phase II awardees with the matching firms. The firms were similar
in most respects. The awardees had slightly larger employment in 1985; the matching firms,
91t may be questioned why I matched firms exclusively on the basis of their industry and
employment, rather than also matching on geographic proximity, or some other attribute. My
rationale was that my approach would minimize possible biases due to inter-industry differences
that would be very difficult to control for otherwise. (Most studies that control for industry
differences use data at the four-digit SIC code level, which is much more crude than the degree
of industry matching done here.) Geographic differences, however, could be (and were)
addressed through the use of information about venture activity in each zip code.
14greater sales. The SBIR awardees were more likely to have received venture financing by the end
of 1985 (10°/0vs. 7°/0for the matching firms) and to be located in either California or Massachusetts
(35% VS.26%).
A final step in constructing the sample was determining the employment and sales of the
SBIR Phase II awardees and the matching firms at the end of 1995.’0 For publicly traded firms, I
used SEC filings. For private firms, I employed, in order of preference, the 1996 editions of the
Corporate Technolo~Directory, Dun’s Marketing Services’ Million Dollar Directory [1996], Gale
Research’s Ward’s Business Directory of U.S. Private and Public Companies [1996], National
Register Publishing Company’s Directory of Leading Private Companies [1996], and a
considerable number of state and industry business directories in the collections of Harvard
Business School’s Baker Library, the Boston Public Library, and the Library of Congress. For
firms that I could not find in published directories, I employed several electronic databases: the
Company Intelligence and Database America compilations available through LEXIS’S
COMPANY/USPRIV libr~, VentureOne’s Venture Data System, and the American Business
Disk CD-ROM directory.
For firms where I could not ascertain employment and sales, I checked the news stories
compiled in LEXIS’S NEWS/ALLNEWS library and the Business Dateline, F&S Index, and Wall
‘“In a few cases, firms did not disclose 1985 sales. Furthermore, SBIR awardees were only
requested to report ranges for 1985 sales. Consequently, in all cases where firms did not report
sales, or where reported sales were in one of the ranges above $1 million, I ascertained 1985
sales using the 1986 editions of the same sources used to determine 1995 sales.
15Street Journal Index CD-ROM files. These searches of news stories revealed that many of firms
for which I was unable to obtain 1995 sales and employment data had gone out of business. I did
not include in the analysis the employment and sales of firms that had been acquired, unless the
firm continued to be operated as a separate subsidiary through the end of 1995. Another exception
was cases where the purchase of the firm was an asset sale as part of a bankruptcy, in which case
employment and sales were recorded as zero. In some cases, I was only able to determine a range
in which sales fell. In these cases, I employed the mid-point of this range.
4. Empirical Analysis
Table 6 compares the growth of the Phase II awardees with the matching firms. The mean
employment increase from the end of 1985 to the end of 1995 was greater for the awardees (a boost
of 26 ,employees vs. 5), as was the sales increase ($5 million vs. $2 million). For the mean SBIR
awardee, this represented an 56°/0increase in employment and a 123°/0boost in sales (in inflation-
adjusted dollars). The table also presents various percentile rankings in order to demonstrate that
the differences were not driven by a few outliers. At each reported percentile the changes in
employment and sales were more positive for the awardees, These differences were statistically
significant in t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
Tables 7 and 8 examine the impact of SBIR awards in light of the concentration of venture
capital financing. I undertook comparisons similar to those in Table 6, but with an additional
complication: firms were divided by whether (i) their headquarter at the end of 1985 was located
16in a zip code with a private early-stage venture financing in the years 1983-1985 or (ii) their
primary assigmnent was to a four-digit SIC class with such a financing. I determined whether any
(and how many) early-stage financing occurred in each zip code and SIC class through the
Venture Intelligence Database described above.
The differences between the SBIR awardees and the matching firms in the zip codes with
one or more venture financin~ were pronounced For instance, employment increased by 47 for
these firms, as opposed to decreasing by 5 for the non-awardees The differences were much less
pronounced elsewhere (employment rose by 13,
statistically significant only among the firms in
as opposed to by 10). These differences were
regions with venture activity. For the average
SBIR awardee in a zip code with venture activity—which had 57 employees and $3.9 million in
sales in 1985-employment over the next decade grew by 83°/0 and inflation-adjusted sales by
169%. These patterns are depicted in Figures 1 and 2. The first picture shows the number of seed
and early-stage venture capital investments in each county in the continental U.S. between 1983
and 1985; the second depicts the mean employment growth of SBIR awardees in each county
between 1985 and 1995.”
1‘These patterns were also robust to the use of a third measure of firm success, the increase in
public market value. For the subset of SBIR awardees and matching firms that were publicly
traded sometime between January 1985 and December 1995, I examined the change in valuations
over this interval. I determined these valuations through the databases of the Center for Research
in Securities Prices and the several Moody’s stock guides. The public market valuation of the
541 SBIR awardees increased by a total of $9.5 billion in this period. (This is the sum of the
increase in the market value of firms that were publicly traded at the beginning of the period and
the valuation of formerly private firms that went public over these years.) The public market
valuation of the 594 matching firms, on the other hand, only increased by a total of $2.6 billion.
The increase in the public market value of the average SBIR awardee was 19 times greater if the
firm was located in a zip code with an early-stage venture financing in the years 1983-1985, a
17The analysis in Table 8, however, reveals few clear patterns. The differences between the
growth of the SBIR awardees and the matching firms were similar, whether the companies were in
an industry that received venture financing or not.
These patterns remained pronounced when I disaggregated the matching firms. If the
positive performance of the SBIR Phase II awardees was due primarily to the selection of superior
firms rather than the infision of capital, we might expect the Phase I awardees to similarly display
rapid growth. These firms, despite receiving much smaller awards, went through an exhaustive
review process: only 12°/0of applicants were selected for these preliminary grants in the first three
program years (U.S. General Accounting Office [1987b]). (In the Phase II selection process, 50V0
of the applicants received awards.)
The growth of sales and employment was only slightly greater among the 294 firms that
received SBIR Phase I awards than the 300 firms taken from the Corporate Technolo~ Directo~.
For instance, the mean employment for the Phase I awardees increased by 6.2 jobs, while for the
Directory firms, the increase was 4.2. (Recall that the increase in the Phase 11 awardees’
employment was over 26 johs, ) The differences between the SBIR Phase II awardees that were
significant in Tables 6 and 7 remained so when the Phase II awardees were only compared either to
the Phase I awardees or to the Corporate Technology DirectoW firms.
difference significant at the five percent confidence level. There were no significant differences
in the changes in public market valuations of SBIR Phase II awardees and non-awardees among
those firms located in zip codes without early-stage venture activity.
18Tables 9 and 10 examine the growth of employment and sales in a regression framework. I
used 1995 employment and sales as the dependent variable% and employed a variety of
independent variables and specifications. The first two regressions in each table used an ordinary
least squares (OLS) specification. Among the independent variables were 1985 employment or
sales, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm received any Phase II awards in the first three
SBIR finding cycles, measures of the extent of venture capital activity in the firm’s zip code and
SIC class, and interactions between the SBIR dummy variable and the venture capital activity
measures. In the reported regressions, I measured the extent of venture capital activity in two ways:
the number of early-stage financing in the zip code or SIC code, as well as dummy variables
indicating whether there were any such financing.
I also report a variety of alternative specification. First, because 1995 employment and
sales could not be below zero, I used a Tobit specification, which corrected for censored data. (I
also estimated Tobit regressions using the other sets of independent variables, which produced
results similar to the reported OLS analyses.) Second, rather than using a single dummy variable to
denote SBIR awardees, I disaggregate the number of SBIR awards. I employed separate variables
for firms that received only one Phase II SBIR award in the first three cycles, two-to-four such
awards, and so forth. Thir~ I added additional independent variables to the analysis. I was
concerned that the results may have been shaped by some unobserved differences between the
SBIR awardees and the matching firms. I hence controlled for each firm’s age, whether it was
19venture-backed by the end of 1985, and the nature of its industry. Following Gompers [1995], I
controlled for industry effects by using the characteristics of the average public firm in the same
SIC class at the end of 1985. I computed the ratios of market value to book value, tangible assets to
total assets, and R&D spending to sales for all firms with a primary assignment in Compustat to the
same industry as a company in the sample. If there were fewer than four firms assigned to a four-
digit SIC code, I used all firms with a primary assignment to the same three-digit SIC code. I then
computed the average of these ratios. In this way, I controlled for industry differences that may
have affected the ability of firms to raise external financing through traditional sources. For
instance, firms in industries characterized by mostly intangible assets may have found it difficult to
arrange bank financing.
The results strongly supported the suggestions that the impact of SBIR awards was not
uniform. The presence of a SBIR award alone had little impact on employment and sales. Rather,
only the interactions between the SBIR indicator and the measures of venture activity in the zip
code were consistently significant in the employment and sales regressions SBIR awards had a
strongly positive impact on firms that were in areas simultaneously receiving venture financing, but
no significant impact on other firms. This effect wm robust across the different specifications. In
some regressions, the coefficient on the interaction between the SBIR awardee dummy variable and
the measures of venture activity in the region and industry was significantly negative. This
suggested that the beneficial effect of SBIR awards was greatest if the firm was in an area attracting
considerable venture investment, but not in a frequently financed industry.
20I examined the robustness of the regressions in several unreported analyses. The results
were robust to the use of the total dollar volume of early-stage venture financing in the zip code
and SIC class between 1983 and 1985, instead of the number of such awards. I alternatively
employed the number of early-stage financing in the state and the two-digit SIC code as
independent variables. These two alternative specification weakened the significance of the
results, but the coefficients on the interaction terms remained significant at conventional confidence
levels. I re-estimated the equations only using the Phase II SBIR awardees and the Corporate
7’echnolo~ Directory matching firms, as well as only the Phase 11and Phase I SBIR awardees.
The smaller sample sizes led to reduced significance levels, but had little effect on the magnitudes
or signs of the coefficients. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients changed little when
I estimated systems of two equations, with the second equation examining the propensity of firms
to win Phase II awards in the first three program cycles. Finally, rather than employing an OLS or
Tobit specification, I estimatd a two-stage Heckman regression. I first examined whether the firm
survived and then the extent of its growth. The interaction terms remained strong] y significant.
An alternative explanation for the superior growth of the SBIR awardees is that winners
of SBIR awards were more likely to subsequently receive procurement contracts because they
had cultivated relationships with politicians or federal program managers. To examine this
possibility, I restricted the above analysis to the two agencies which made significant numbers of
SBIR awards but were unlikely to undertake procurement contracts with awardees: the National
Science Foundation and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS’s external
21research, and consequently their SBIR awards, overwhelmingly came from the National
Institutes of Health. The gap between the firms that received Phase II awards from these
agencies and those that only received Phase I awards was even greater than that in the sample as
a whole. For instance, firms that received Phase II awards from NSF and HHS in the first three
program cycles grew by 32.6 employees between 1985 and 1995; those that only received Phase
I awards grew by 2.1 employees. 12
5. Conclusions
This paper examined the long-run impact of awards to new
through a major public venture capital initiative, the SBIR program.
high-technology firms made
First, several rationales why
these awards might or might not have had positive effects on firms were explored, as well as
whether the impacts were likely to be stronger in regions and sectors that attracted substantial early-
stage financing from venture capitalists I compared the growth of awardem to a set of matching
firms. The SBIR awardees enjoyed substantially greater employment and sales growth, but these
effects were confined to firms in areas that attracted significant venture financing.
121also compared the awardees from HHS to matching firms specializing in biology and
biochemistry that had received no SBIR awards, with similar results. Another alternative
explanation for the superior growth of the SBIR awardees is that winners of SBIR awards were
more likely to win subsequent SBIR awards. While this may have been true in the initial years
of the program (e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office [1987b]), conversations with federal
officials suggest that it has been much less of an issue in recent years. Not only were SBIR
awards to firms that had receiving multiple previous grants more likely to be scrutinized by the
GAO, resulting in a reluctance to make such grants, but the 1992 reauthorization of the SBIR
program (Public Law 102-564) added additional criteria for the evaluation of SBIR applications
of firms that had received awards in the past.
22I have already discussed some of the issues raised by alternative interpretations of the
results. At least three additional questions can be raised concerning the analysis. One concern is
whether political pressures will lead to a deterioration of the SBIR program’s effectiveness over
time. First, as discussed above, the percentage set-aside for SBIR awards has increased
dramatically. This may be leading program managers to fund less promising firms. Second, the
program has attracted congressional scrutiny due to the geographic concentration of its awards.
Program managers to date have resisted these pressures: the share of finds going to firms in
California or Massachusetts has remained constant at around 40Y0. Because the awards appear to
only have had a positive effect on firms in regions with significant venture financing, the political
pressures towards geographic dispersion-were they to succeed in shifting the distribution of
award~might have a detrimental effect on program effectiveness’3
A second concern about
adjusted to address any capital
expanded during the 1980s. The
the results relates to whether the supply of private equity has
constraints. As discussed above, the pool of venture capital
capital constraints that may have troubled small high-technology
firms during the early 1980s, when these awards were made, may have vanished today. The
13Thepathologies that can result from political pressures on government technology policies are
discussed in Cohen and Nell [1991] and Romer [1993]. On the other hand, SBIR program
managers in most agencies indicate that program quality has increased over time. They argue
that this increase is due to the rising ratio of applicants to awards, and the growing ability of
evaluators to discern the qualities that presage commercial success as well as scientific
excellence. These observations are confirmed by the GAO, which has found [1985, 1987b, 1995]
that in those agencies where a consistent scoring system has been used to rate SBIR applications,
awardees’ scores have risen steadily. In addition, the GAO has found [1985, 1987a] that several
agencies were tardy in coming into compliance with SBA procedures as the program began.
23expansion of the private equity market may have obviated the need for such a program, and the
long-run competitive advantage that SBIR awards confer today may be much lower. These
questions about the changes in the effectiveness of the program over time will only be answerable
in the future.
Another important unanswered question relates to the social benefits of the program.
Numerous studies have suggested that, because of knowledge spillovers, social rates of return to
privately funded R&D are often much higher than the private returns which the firms performing
the research enjoy. This analysis has focused exclusively on private returns, as roughly measured
through sales and employment growth. The differentials between the private and social benefits of
the SBIR awards might be particularly large, because many of them involve very early-stage
technologies (where spillovers to other firms may be more frequent) or those important to national
defense. At the same time, the program’s critics argue that the SBIR set-aside has led to a
reduction in finding for academic research, which may have even greater social benefits [e.g.,
Mervis, 1996]. The program’s impact on social welfare is an important, but difficult to resolve,
issue.
The evidence presented here sugges~ that public initiatives to provide capital for new firms
may have only a limited economic impact. This role, it appears, is much more as a complement to
the venture capital organizations and other private institutions that assist new firms: the impact of
the awards in regions without these private sector mechanisms was minimal. This raises questions
24about recently enacted programs (summarized in Table 1) that encourage public financing of and
guarantees for venture funds that invest in economically disadvantaged areas.
At the same time, SBIR awards appear to have had a positive and substantial long-run
impact on the firms in regions with considerable venture capital activity, In particular, awardees
appear to have grown substantially faster—whether measured by sales or emplo ymen=than a
matching set of firms. These results suggest that economists need to ask somewhat different
questions about such public initiatives.
As discussed in footnote 2, a major focus of economic studies of federal technology
programs has been the issue of “crowding out”: has federal finding led to less private sector
investment, particularly in R&D, than would have occurred otherwise? It is not clear, however,
that this is the proper question to be asking of programs that assist small, possibly capital-
constrained, companies. For many of these firms, a major concern of management is extending the
amount of time until they need to seek refinancing or run out of capital.14 Thus, it is not clear
whether the pattern of small firms using public funds to extend the period before they need to seek
refinancing, rather than using the funds to increase their rate of research funding, should be
14Theability of SBIR finds to give researchers additional time to prove the viability of a new
technology was repeatedly emphasized in my interviews with awardees. More generally, the
impact that concerns about running out of cash-colloquially known as “tie dates’’—have on
the management of new ventures is discussed in Sahlman [1990]. Gompers [1995] documents
how venture capitalists adjust the amount of capital they p;ovide and hence
until the firm needs to seek refinancing in response to uncertainty
asymmetries.
the amount of time
and informational
25considered problematic. While an assessment of the ultimate success of firms receiving public
venture finding may not answer all the questions about these programs, this type of analysis is an
important complement to studies of the short-run impact on R&D spending.
Even if, as Wallsten [1996] argues, capital constraints are unimportant and firms simply
substitute SBIR finding for their own expenditures, the funds provided by the program may still be
important. One of the important benefits conferred by SBIR awards, participants argue, is the
signal that they provide to potential investors and customers.]s Were SBIR awards purely an
honorary designation, they might more readily be designated for explicitly political considerations.
The presence of a substantial financial component—and the associated regulatory provisions that
govern such awards-may limit these pressures, and insure that the awards are an effective signal
of the quality of a firm’s technology.
15Asillustrations of this claim, several directories of high-technology firms denote companies
that have won SBIR awards, and at least 103 press releases concerning SBIR awards were issued
between August 1995 and July 1996.
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.uTable 2: Volume of Venture Capital Activity
Venture Capital Early-Stage Investments by Venture Funds





1981 4452 806 227
1982 6391 813 343
1983 11796 1707 413
1984 16640 1689 568
1985 20880 1194 529
1986 25186 14’78 716
1987 30645 1440 796
1988 34024 1272 674
1989 37379 1119 623
1990 38292 705 571
1991 38148 458 335
1992 38910 646 435
1993 36401 765 368
1994 36066 1005 499
1995 36362 1438 611
Leading States, Early-Stage Venture Financing, 1983-1985
State $ of Financing % of Total #of Finarrcings
California 2089 45.5 770
Massachusetts 643 14.0 310
Texas 299 6.5 130
New York 153 3.3 65
New Jersey 136 3.0 97
Leading Industries, Early-Stage Venture Financing, 1983-1985
Industry (SIC Code) $ of Financing ‘A of Total #of Financing
Prepackaged Software (7372) 570 12.4 347
Semiconductors(3674) 402 8.8 91
Computer Peripherals (3577) 328 7.1 130
Telephone Apparatus (366 1) 317 6,9 107
Electronic Computers (3571) 254 5,5 75
Note: The table provides an overview of investment activity by U.S. venture capital organizations. The first panel
indicates the total size of the venture capital pool and the amount of early-stage investment, The venture capital pool is
defined as the capital raised by all venture finds that had a first closing within the past ten years. The second and third
panels display the amount of early-stage investments in the period 1983-1985, disaggregate by the leading states and
industries, All amount figures are in millions of 1994 dollars, No data are available on the number of early-stage
investments prior to 1981.
Source: Private Equity Analyst [1996], Venture Economics [1996], and unpublished Venture Economics databases.Table 3: Volume of SBIR Awards














































Note: The table provides an overview of the SBIR program. It indicates the amount of awards, the number of such
awards, and the share of external R&D spending that all agencies spending more than $100 million on external R&D
were required to set aside for the program. The Department of Defense was allowed an extra year to reach the 1.25°/0
target, and consequently had lower set-aside levels between 1983 and 1986. A1l amount figures are in millions of 1994
dollars.
Source: U.S. Small Business Administration [1994, 1996].Table 4: Construction of Sample of SBIR Phase II Awardees and Matching Firms
Number of Firms
General Accounting Office Survey:
Sample Size 933
Respondents to 1986 General Accounting Office Survey 750
Respondents to 1988 General Accounting Office Survey 729
Respondents to Either General Accounting Office Survey 835
Of Respondents to Either General Accounting Office Survey:
Received One or More Phase 11Awards in First Three Program Cycles 541
Did Not Receive Phase II Award in First Three Program Cycles 294
Matching Firms Selected Through 1986 Corporate Technolo~Directoiy 300
Final Sample:
Phase 11Awardees from Survey 541
Matching Firms from Survey and Corporate TechnoIo~Direclo~ 594Table 5: Comparison of SBIR Phase II Awardees and Matching Firms
Variable Mean StandardDeviation Minimum A4mimum
541 SBIR Phase II Awardees
Year Founded
Received Venture Financing (thru 1985)?
1985 Employment
1985 Sales
Publicly Traded in January 1985?
#of Phase II Awards in First 3 Cycles
Located in California?
Located in Massachusetts?























































Received Venture Financing (thru 1985)?
1985 Employment
1985 Sales
Publicly Traded in January 1985?
#of Phase II Awards in First 3 Cycles
Located in California?
Located in Massachusetts?
#of Early-Stage Venture Financing, 1983-1985, in . .
State 203.6 278.4 0 770
Zip Code 1.8 5.6 0 46




























Note: The table provides summary statistics on the 541 firms that received SBIR Phase II awards in the tir~t three program
cycles and the 594 matching firms in the sample. All sales figures are in millions of current dollars.Table 6: Growth of SBIR Phase 11Awardees and Matching Firms
SBIR Phase II Awardees Matching Firms p- Valuefrom Comparison
Comparison of Means [t-tests]
Change in Employment, 1985-1995
Mean 26.20 5.22 0.057
Standard Error 16.32 4,78
Observations 499 561
Change in Sales, 1985-1995
Mean 5.05 1.76
Standard Emor 1.30 0:63
Observations 493 551
0.019
Comparison of Distributions [Wilcoxon tests]
Change in Employment, 1985-1995
90’hPercentile 66 31
75* Percentile 10 5
Median -1 -2
25ti Percentile -8 -lo
1O’hPercentile -45 -50
Change in Sales, 1985-1995
90* Percentile 9.0 5.5
75* Percentile 2.0 0.8
Median 0.1 -0.1




Note: The table summarizes the change in the employment and sales of the 541 firms that received SBIR Phase II
awards in the first three program cycles and the 594 matching firms in the sample. All sales figures are in millions of
current dollars.Table 7: Growth of SBIR Phase 11Awardees and Matching Firms, by Location
SBIR Phase II Awardees Matching Firms p- VaIuefrom t-Test
Firms Locatedin Z@ Code wi~han Early-Stage Venture Financing, 1983-1985
Change in Employment, 1985-1995
Mean 47.43 -4.61 0.038
Standard Error 22,99 8.37
Observations 190 181
Change in Sales, 1985-1995
Mean 9,03 1.23
Standard Error 3.11 0.99
Observations 189 175
0.021
Firms Locatedin Zip Code without an Ear~-Stage Venture Financing, 1983-1985
Change in Employment, 1985-1995
Mean 13.14 9.90 0.752
Standard Error 8.80 5,86
Observations 309 380
Change in Sales, 1985-1995
Mean 2.58 2.02 0.627
Standard Error 0.81 0.81
Observations 304 376
Note: The table summarizes the change in the employment and sales of the 541 firms that received SBIR Phase 11
awards in the first three program cycles and the 594 matching firms in the sample. Firms are divided by whether their
headquarters in 1985 was in a zip code with one or more seed or early-stage venture financing between 1983 and
1985. All sales figures are in millions of current dollars.Table 8: Growth of SBIR Phase II Awardees and Matching Firms, by Industry
SBIR Phase II Awardees Matching Firms p- Valuefrom t-Test
Firms Located in SIC Code with an Early-Stage Venture Financing, 1983-1985
Change in Employment, 1985-1995
Mean 28.45 12.83 0.289
Standard Error 12.40 7,64
Observations 324 310
Change in Sales, 1985-1995
Mean 5.04 2.35 0.146
Standard Error 1.51 1.04
Observations 319 306
Firms Localedin SIC Code without an Early-Stage Venture Financing, 1983-1985
Change in Employment, 1985-1995
Mean 22.02 -4.05 0.116
Standard Error 18.46 5.04
Observations 175 251
Change in Sales, 19S5-1 995
Mean 5.07 1.04 0.061
Standard Error 2.42 0.57
Observations 174 245
Note: The table summarizes the change in the employment and sales of the 541 firms that received SBIR Phase II
awards in the first three program cycles and the 594 matching firms in the sample. Firms are divided by whether their
primary industry assignment in 1985 was to a SIC code with one or more seed or early-stage venture financing
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